Introduction
The typical twentieth-century organization has not operated well in a rapidly changing environment. Structure, systems, practices, and culture have often been more of a drag on change than a facilitator. If environmental volatility continues to increase, as most people now predict, the standard organization of the twentieth century will likely become a dinosaur. 1 This quote from Professor John P. Kotter's book Leading Change applies to some changes the United States Army faced in the late twentieth century. The Army faced persistent conflict in the Global War on Terrorism that it had never faced before. It found that its forces were not well suited to the conflict and needed to be smaller and able to be a "plug and play" force that could be tailored to specific missions. The solution was modularity. In response, the Army's personnel community developed Personnel Services Delivery Redesign (PSDR). LTC Nichols, the director of the Human Resource Qualification Course stated, Why did the Adjutant General Corps give up its personnel support battalions? The answer is rather simple, but the effects of that decision are still being discovered today. … The short answer is that the Army has transformed into a brigade combat team/brigade-centric force, restructuring brigades to have the organic capabilities they need to accomplish assigned tasks. The long answer is that the human resources (HR) community was told to reduce its support command and control footprint on the battlefield, and the Army's transformation to brigade-centric operations allowed for the transfer of the functions of the personnel service battalion to the S-1. 2 Two issues lie within this explanation. Because the decision was made after being "told to reduce footprint" 3 rather than based on a solid mission analysis of capability needed. This invites risk because the critical mission analysis may be lacking. Surprisingly, there has been very little research into how effective PSDR has been. In his assessment of PSDR, COL Michael Masley laments this fact as well as the fact that the available published research comes from the junior officer practitioners rather than the personnel community's senior leaders, An overall observation found that there is a lack of documented lessons learned and writings by senior HR professionals (Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels) about how Army leaders implemented and conducted PSDR at the division, corps and theater levels, even though junior HR professionals (Lieutenants to Majors, Warrant Officers, and Noncommissioned Officers) are writing about their experiences at the battalion and brigade levels. … However finding a documented account written by a senior HR leader (Lieutenant Colonel or above) about the impacts and implementation of PSDR at the division and higher level was almost impossible. 4 This study examines brigade level strength management as a critical component of PSDR and finds that the redesign was effective in many areas, but that there was an overreach on strength management doctrine. Strength management is the term that I will use in this study. It is synonymous with the doctrinal term "Personnel Readiness Management" (PRM), which is itself a subset of the Manning the Force" HR Core Competency. FM 1-0 explains this as "The objective of the manning the force strategy is to ensure that the right people are in the right places with the right skills to fully capitalize on their warfighting expertise. Properly manning units is vital to assuring the fulfillment of missions as a strategic element of national policy; it enhances predictability; and ensures that leaders have the people necessary to perform assigned tasks." 5 There is no doctrinal term of "strength monitoring." The accepted use of "strength monitoring" came about as a result of moving strength management functions to brigades. Strength monitoring came to mean a relatively more passive oversight role of a brigade's higher headquarters. Personnel strength management functions need to be returned to the general officer headquarters where it formally resided rather than the colonel level brigade that it moved to under the redesigned concept. Moving strength management back to divisions also completely eliminates strength monitoring and clears up confusion as to roles and responsibilities. The rationale for returning the strength management functions is not an indictment of the PSDR concept. PSDR was a much needed redesign of personnel doctrine -the concept just needs to be tweaked a bit. Masley had it right in his assessment of PSDR when he stated, Perhaps one answer is that senior leaders who implemented PSDR did the best they could during a challenging time and accomplished many positive steps during the transformation of the Army's Human Resources Support. Then again, the Army's HR community led by Adjutant General Corps (AG) professionals (civilians, officers and enlisted Soldiers) must still refine and PSDR to continue to improve HR support to the Army for the future. 6 The justification for returning to the old way of doing business is based on numerous factors. The larger staffs of general officer level organizations are more capable than brigade staffs.
Put another way, brigade staff lack the resources, expertise and training (as a general statement, there are exceptions) to conduct strength management. A corollary is that brigade strength management is often personality dependent on the personality and background of the S1, brigade 
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Army Brigade S1 shops were increased from seven personnel to thirteen personnel. 7 BCT/BDE discrete TOE S1 section with reduction in SRC-12 units." 8 What has occurred is that there is a habitual relationship with Divisions and Corps. Because the underlying assumptions of PSDR has not occurred, it is completely appropriate to re-examine the design of PSDR.
Brigade Versus Division Capability
Brigades are fully capable of performing many of the PSDR functions that they received as part of their new mission. However, strength management is problematic. Many Brigade S1s are majors from other branches who may be on their first personnel assignment. This major has a lieutenant as the only other commissioned officer in the S1 section. The LT had the title of Brigade Strength Manager. A LT simply lacks the experience to be an effective strength manager. The experience from the field suggests that the position should be authorized as a CPT. 1st Infantry Division conducted a study on strength management capabilities/structure and concluded, "BCT S1
-No change accept (sic) strength manager should be a CPT (42B)." 9 10 th Mountain Division had the same conclusion when they stated, "BCT -the lieutenant strength mgr should be a CPTprimary focus, personnel readiness. Virtually all of the BDEs that I've observed in 10th MTN as the Deputy G1 and G1 since implementation of PSDR filled the LT billet in the BDE S1 with a CPT. The common consensus is that a LT rarely possesses the experience or technical expertise to perform that function effectively." 10 Because Manning The Force is an HR Core Competency, failure of that task risks failure of the HR function and potentially failure of the entire mission. A unit will be substantially at risk of degraded mission performance if they do not have the right personnel in sufficient numbers. These ideas were prevalent in the Forces Command G1 Strength Management Review. Some may argue that a LT can be mentored by other officers in the Bde S1
or that strength management duties can be performed, in part, by the Bde S1. This is problematic.
The only other officer in the Bde S1 organization is the MAJ who serves as the S1. The Bde S1
also had a myriad of other responsibilities other than strength management. One author went so far to point out that , "a brigade or battalion S-1 primarily served as a unit Adjutant rather than an HR professional. The NHRP [National Human Resources Provider] disseminated policy guidance through a series of regulations and Department of the Army pamphlets." 11 However, changing culture takes time. The S-1 will likely always have some adjutant responsibilities. The distinction between adjutant and more technical personnel duties is the difference between AG and G1. The adjutant duties are more commander's staff assistant functions. These could be items like calendar management, protocol, rating scheme management etc. The G1 duties are the HR Core
Competencies of: Manning the Force, Provide HR Services, Coordinate Personnel Support, and HR Planning and Operations. 12 As an example of the demands of an S-1 time, the feedback of 1ID is very instructive. Their Division STB S1 was not able to do strength management in a deployed environment.
Upon deployment, the DHHB S1 was expected to manage not only their own Unit but numerous RFFs as well as 39 separate FTNs that are currently OPCON to the CJTF-1. The unit S1 could not manage this load and it shifted to the strength team. In a deployed theater the strength team is engaged with accountability and management of the FML (Force Manning Level) and BOG (Boots on the Ground). The G1/J1 Team would not be able to do this if we had not created a strength team in Garrison. 13 The 1 st Infantry Division G1 also noted the limitations of Brigade S1s doing strength management.
We do allow them to work individual things, however overall all has to come through G1. [Are they effective?] Not necessarily, when they are not, they call the G1 and I I review and if necessary I make the call and coordinate directly and if necessary I make the call and coordinate directly for them which usually works better.
Continuing the theme of experience and expertise, the G1 stated,
The Strength Manager is a 2LT at a BCT. Usually the LT comes directly out of OBC and thrown into the job with no knowledge of strength management. Strength Management is more of an art than a function of trying to predict moves, trying to think two or three steps ahead of both your CG and HRC to ensure the unit is prepared for a mission. As well as at times working issues to ensure your Commander has everything he needs in terms of personnel to complete a mission (being relevant to your commander). This may not necessarily line up with HRC manning levels but combat missions are not always in alignment with MTOE. For example here in Afghanistan as a CJTF-1, I have numerous requirements my MTOE does not fill, JVB, RCC, development cell, reintegration cell etc. All have to be run by a FG Officer that the MTOE does not take into account so you move personnel internally, divert, beg HRC for "just a couple more 01As" and in turn meet your commanders intent any way you can. 
Personnel Training
One of the recurring themes in the research literature was a need for training. The PSDR pilot found, S-1 Soldiers need/desire additional training.
Commanders and S-1s expressed a strong desire for S-1 specific training (strength management, how does the HRC assign soldiers etc.). Majority of training provided by the Pilot training teams was system specific (EMILPO, EDAS, and TOPMIS) and to only select unit S1 personnel. The S-1 officers assigned are not AG officers and the transition to the S-1 position is difficult and challenging. 20 There were three recommendations one of which was, "Implement sustainment training at the installation managed by the G-1 or MPD." 21 Having a robust G1 organization facilitates training as a CSL selected senior HR officer will be leading an organization large enough to provide valuable training and oversight. In the PSDR pilot AAR, the finding was that, "G1 was performing most strength management functions." 22 A recommendation was, "Division of responsibilities should be spelled out in doctrine such as FM 1-0 and not left to individual installations." 23 Similarly, the pilot observed, Division of strength management responsibilities between BCT/BDE S-1s and G-1 is unclear. Role of the G-1 in strength management continues to evolve. The modular G-1 is no longer authorized a robust strength management section; however, the G-1 retains responsibility to monitor unit fill, translate the Commander's intent, and perform Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting (PASR). BCT/Bde commander's now own their own DMSL and are responsible for their own personnel fill. 24 It seems that nearly eight years later, neither of these situations has appreciably changed. Even this statement from the pilot AAR points out significant problems that was never fully addressed: roles and responsibilities are still not completely codified in doctrine and it seems universally clear that G-1s have some strength responsibilities (at least monitoring, if not management). However, the resources to accomplish even a minimal mission were stripped from the MTOE. Restoring doctrine and previous personnel cuts is the most efficient way to address these long-standing concerns.
Modularity Assumptions
As noted by numerous authors (Wark, Masley, Gill, Nichols etc) as well as the Army documents on PSDR, the assumption of modularity was that BCTs would be "plug and play" and not necessarily have a habitual relationship with a parent division headquarters. This was most clearly stated in "Adjutant General Corps HR Support to the Modular Army" when they stated the personnel impact of PSDR is "A BCT -centric force means a major shift in workload to BCT/BDE (no habitual relationships with DIV/CORPS), major changes from linear processing, results in increases in BCT/BDE discrete TOE S1 section with reduction in SRC-12 units." 25 Previously strength management was done at the Division level. Because this was a BQ or KD job, it was highly sought after similar to the way a maneuver officer might seek an S3 job.
This usually resulted in the Division Strength Manager being "one of the best" with a great deal of HR (and many times specific strength management) experience. Oftentimes, the Division Strength
Manager had previous S1 experience. The Division Strength Manager had a robust team. The
Enlisted Strength Management section was led by a warrant officer with many years of experience while the officer strength management section was led by a company grade officer. The level of capability was much greater when strength management was at the Division level. This would no longer be strength monitoring and has now crossed into strength management.
As noted previously, HRC will not crosslevel on an installation. This is completely logical and follows good de-centralization principles. However, Division G1 shops are not resourced to crosslevel (at least if there were significant crossleveling and diversions taking place). Also, once the Division HQs is engaged in a significant amount of crossleveling and/or diversions, then they are engaged in strength management functions.
Current doctrine may very well state that Divisions will engage in strength monitoring vice strength management. However, the reality on the ground is that Division Commanders expect their G1s to be conducting strength management. Because Division G1 shops are not resourced for strength management, this puts the Division G1s in a difficult position. Obviously, they will do what their boss expects. But there will be a cost. Missions that they are resourced for will suffer or Soldiers will just have to "do more with less." Either case is sub-optimal, especially in an Army that may already be stretched thin.
Development of AG Officers
The 
Recommendations
FORSCOM recognizes the need for strength management at the division level. The FORSCOM characterization of the issue is:
• Corps and Division G1s do not have a common operating picture with regard to strength management (SM) • HQs, FORSCOM has expressed concern with the current level of Strength Management capability in our Divisions, BCTs, Mission Support Elements (MSE) and Human Resources (HR) Command G1/S1 sections.
• Per FORSCOM G1 several senior Army leaders have raised concerns that a strength management capability is required at Div/Corps level, especially in light of the effort to align BCTs and other BDE elements to the divisions.
• IAW TRADOC TASKORD IN120934 -US Army Soldier Support Institute (SSI) with assistance from CAC/MCCoE/MCoE will conduct a DOTMLPFP and troop-to-task analysis with Div/BCT/MSE and HR Commands in an attempt to uncover how much time and resources are used to conduct SM Operations and identify second and third order effects, providing feedback with associated force structure change recommendations NLT 16 July 2012. In a zero growth constrained environment, the proposal of adding positions may not be feasible. If that is found to be the case by force management, then I suggest using echelons above Another possible choice of billpayer is the installation MSE. Several G-1s note that they have already tapped into installation MSEs to assist with strength management functions. 35 The drawback to using the MSE as a billpayer is that MSEs are, in many cases, highly civilianized organizations and thus may not be deployable and thus may not meet "green suit" billpayer. A second drawback is that MSEs have assumed an area mission and support all units on a given installation. That capability will have to be maintained.
PSDR is six years old. We have learned many lessons. Masley stated the crux of the issue,"Did the HR community get PSDR right? A simple response of yes or no will not give justice to the question or the analysis of PSDR." 36 The EPS part of PSDR was highly successful, but strength management functions need to be maintained at Division and above level. Because the EPS portion of PSDR is so successful, we must resist the urge to "correct" PSDR by making 
